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JUSTICE AND GENDER: AN UNFINISHED
DEBATE
Susan Moller Okin*
INTRODUCTION
The revival of Anglo-American political theory and the revival of
feminism in what came to be called its "second wave" both emerged
early in the second half of the twentieth century. To situate both,
consider the publication dates of some of the foundational works of
each movement: Simone de Beauvoir's The Second Sex' appeared in
1949 and was translated into English by 1952; Isaiah Berlin's Two
Concepts of Liberty2 was published in 1958, as was John Rawls's
Justice as Fairness;3 Betty Friedan's The Feminine Mystique4 appeared
in 1963 and Kate Millett's Sexual Politics5 in 1970; John Rawls's
complete A Theory of Justice6 came out in 1971. Yet despite the fact
that these two revivals were contemporaneous, there was for a couple
of decades very little dialogue between the participants in each of
them. Feminist political theorists tended to turn their attention to the
* Marta Sutton Weeks Professor on Ethics in Society, Stanford University; Matina S.
Horner Distinguished Visiting Research Professor, The Radcliffe Institute for
Advanced Study, Harvard University 2003-2004. Special thanks to David Miller,
Jerry Cohen, and other members of the All Souls' Oxford Political Theory seminar
(February 2002); to Cass Sunstein, Martha Nussbaum, David Strauss and other
members of their seminar at the University of Chicago Law School (November 10,
2003), and to Linda McClain, Marion Smiley, Tracy Higgins and other participants in
the Fordham University School of Law Conference "Rawls and the Law" (November
7-8, 2003) for their helpful comments on several different versions of this paper. An
earlier version of the paper was translated into French by Patrick Savidan, and
appeared as Justice et identit6 generique: un debat en cours, in 2 Comprendre: Le Lien
Familiel 67 (Francoise de Singly & Sylvie Mesure eds., 2001).
[Editors' Note: Professor Okin died just as she was completing this Article.
The Fordham Law Review recognizes her contribution to the field as a scholar, and is
proud to publish her Article as part of this conference on "Rawls and the Law."]
1. Simone de Beauvoir, The Second Sex (H.M. Parshley ed. & trans., Knopf
1953) (1949).
2. Isaiah Berlin, Two Concepts of Liberty (1958).
3. John Rawls, Justice as Fairness (1958), reprinted in John Rawls, Collected
Papers 47 (Samuel Freeman ed., 1999).
4. Betty Friedan, The Feminine Mystique (1963).
5. Kate Millett, Sexual Politics (1970).
6. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (1971).
1537
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
historical canon of political thought, rather than to contemporary
works.7 Feminist philosophers embarked on classifying and analyzing
the theories of the feminist movement itself.8 And feminist activists,
at least in the United States and Great Britain, concerned themselves
to a large extent with consciousness raising and with urgent public
policy issues such as reforming rape law, drawing attention to
domestic violence, and trying to get the Equal Rights Amendment
passed. On the other hand, the leaders of the newly re-burgeoning
field of political philosophy-John Rawls, Ronald Dworkin, Brian
Barry, and Steven Lukes, for example-paid no attention in their
writings to the feminist movement and its ideas.9 They appeared to
assume, as had most of those in the long tradition that preceded them,
that inequalities between the sexes were "natural" rather than
political, and were therefore not an appropriate concern for
philosophical inquiry. By the end of the century, however, things had
changed significantly, as a full-scale debate emerged between John
Rawls and various feminist critics of his already classic work, A
Theory of Justice.
Here, I shall give an account of this debate, and try to advance it a
little further. I start by defining some of its key terms and pointing to
some of the most relevant concepts of Rawls's theory of justice. Next,
I briefly address some feminist critiques of Rawls that have emerged
as parts of feminist critiques of liberalism as a whole, together with
feminist responses to such critiques. Then I give an account of the
debate about gender and justice between John Rawls and those who
have critiqued his theory from a feminist perspective but have also
valued, and used in their own work, some of its central concepts and
arguments. Finally, I give a brief response to Rawls's recently
published response to critics on the subject of gender, justice, and the
family. I shall argue that, although Rawls eventually responded
directly to those I term his "constructive" feminist critics, the
distinction between comprehensive and political liberalism that he
introduces in Political Liberalism severely diminishes the capacity of
his theory of justice to answer feminist criticism. Only by allowing
that his principles of justice apply directly to the internal life of
families-which Rawls clearly resists-and by restricting "reasonable
conceptions of the good" to those that are non-sexist, could one revise
7. See, e.g., The Sexism of Social and Political Theory: Women and
Reproduction from Plato to Nietzsche (Lorenne M.G. Clark & Lynda Lange eds.,
1979); Jean Bethke Elshtain, Public Man, Private Woman: Women in Social and
Political Thought (1981); Susan Moller Okin, Women in Western Political Thought
(1979).
8. See, e.g., Alison Jaggar, Feminist Politics and Human Nature (1983).
9. Michael Walzer was a partial exception. In Spheres of Justice (1974), he
included a brief chapter on the family, which addressed issues of gender to some
extent.
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the theory so that it both includes women and has an effective and
consistent account of moral development.
For clarification, let me first define "justice" and "gender," as I use
the terms in what follows. By "justice" I mean social justice or, more
precisely, distributive justice-that is to say, the ways in which goods
and benefits, burdens and responsibilities, should be allocated within
society. Theories of justice are centrally concerned with which initial
or acquired personal characteristics or positions in society should
affect the social distribution." They are about whether, how, and to
what extent, beginnings should affect outcomes. And yet, although a
person's sex is an initial personal characteristic that is frequently
accorded great social significance and has a vast influence on many
outcomes, contemporary theories of justice have by and large
sidestepped the question of whether, or how, this should be so.
"Gender" is a more complicated term. It once applied mainly to
language-in English as well as in languages in which far more words
are gendered. In its new, much larger meaning, the word refers to the
deeply entrenched social institutionalization of sexual difference. This
new meaning, developed by feminist scholars in many disciplines,
reflects the fact that we now think that so much of what has
traditionally been thought of as innate, sexual difference is socially
produced or constructed. A whole range of factors-from the almost
exclusively female nurture of infants and small children and the toys
given to girls and boys to our use of language and our cultural and
religious systems of belief-contribute to making us into the women
or men, the gendered persons, we become. Moreover, the structure of
our societies assumes gender, at the same time helping to perpetuate
it. Institutions, from workplaces and schools to legislatures, assume
that persons are independent beings who neither need daily care nor
give it to others, while they largely ignore the needs of those who in
fact provide most of this daily care. Such gendered institutions and
social structures contribute to the inclusion and privileging of men and
the disproportionate burdening of women and their exclusion from
positions of power, wealth and authority. A wide range of academic
disciplines, especially in the social sciences (economics being the most
resistant to the need for reconstruction), shore up these arrangements
by making gendered assumptions that bear little or no relation to the
real world, such as that unpaid work has no value, and that families
are headed by benevolent altruists. Theories based on such
assumptions help to legitimate and reproduce the gendered social
institutions and structures that keep women, as a sex, relatively
powerless, even in societies in which we have formal legal equality
with men.
10. Some have criticized this distributive paradigm of justice, but I cannot address
that issue here. See, e.g., Iris Marion Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference
(1990).
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Feminist scholars in many disciplines have explored the many
dimensions of the social and psychological construction of our
gendered identities and our gendered societies, and have uncovered
the historical and cultural variability of gender." The significance of
late twentieth century work on sex, gender, and the relation between
the two is vast. Feminist scholarship has undermined centuries of
argument that started with the notion that not only the distinct
differentiation of male and female, but also the division of labor by
sex and the domination of women by men, is natural and inevitable. It
has challenged theories that claim to be about individuals, but are
actually about adult males (with unmentioned wives in the
background), as well as theories based on the idea that families are
benevolent despotisms. It thus opens up for discussion and debate
many issues not previously thought of as political or economic, or
even considered in discussions of justice. Not surprisingly, feminist
theorists have raised many questions about both past and
contemporary theories of social justice, including Rawls's prominent
theory.
I. JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS AND THE BASIC STRUCTURE
Rawls states early on that his theory of justice is about "the basic
structure" of society. This basic structure, he says, is "the way in
which the major social institutions distribute fundamental rights and
duties and determine the division of advantages from social
cooperation.""2  He makes clear from the start that the political
constitution and the principal social and economic arrangements are
such "major institutions" because
[t]aken together as one scheme, [they] define men's rights and duties
and influence their life prospects, what they can expect to be and
how well they can hope to do. The basic structure is the primary
subject of justice because its effects are so profound and present
from the start.1
3
Not surprisingly, given this definition, Rawls specifies that the family,
or rather more precisely "the monogamous family" is one such major
social institution. 4 According to his initial, crucial, characterization of
"the primary subject of justice," then, it seems that how families
"distribute fundamental rights and duties and determine the division
11. Some important examples are Nancy Chodorow, The Reproduction of
Mothering (1978); Dorothy Dinnerstein, The Mermaid and the Minotaur: Sexual
Arrangements and Human Malaise (1976); Linda J. Nicholson, Gender and History:
The Limits of Social Theory in the Age of the Family (1986); Joan Wallach Scott,
Gender and the Politics of History (1988); Michelle Z. Rosaldo, The Use and Abuse of
Anthropology, 5 Signs 389 (1980).
12. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, supra note 6, § 2, at 7.
13. Id.
14. See id.
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of advantages from social cooperation" should be part of it.15
Accordingly, a reader might expect that, among other issues
concerning family justice, the traditional division of labor by sex and
its many social, economic and political ramifications will constitute
matters of concern in the ensuing theory.
As is well known, Rawls claims that the principles of justice chosen
in the original position will be fair in the sense that, in arriving at
them, persons cannot be partial to themselves, to their personal
characteristics or their own conceptions of the good. Since in the
original position "[n]o one knows his situation in society nor his
natural assets,.., therefore no one is in a position to tailor principles
to his advantage."16 The two principles that Rawls argues would be so
chosen are the principle of equal basic liberty and the difference
principle (to which is appended the condition of "fair equality of
opportunity"). "[T]he first requires equality in the assignment of
basic rights and duties, while the second holds that social and
economic inequalities ... are just only if they result in compensating
benefits for everyone, and in particular for the least advantaged
members of society."' 7  The only justifiable deviations from
socioeconomic equality, according to the difference principle, are
those that-indirectly, by providing incentives that increase the size of
the economic "pie" that is to be divided-work so as to benefit the
least advantaged."i And the principle of fair equality of opportunity
requires that persons of equal abilities and motivations have the same
chance of attaining any position in the just society, regardless of their
circumstances of origin.19
Much of Part II of A Theory of Justice, entitled "Institutions," is
devoted to explaining how the principles of justice would influence
the design of the constitutional framework and the various institutions
of a just society. In a great m6lange of relatively "pure" theory and
applied theory, Rawls discusses how rights-establishing constitutions,
legislatures, legal systems, economic systems, systems of taxation,
intergenerational considerations, constraints on majority rule, and the
treatment of conscientious objectors might all operate so as to
translate the principles of justice, which he has argued can be derived
from the original position, into practice in a just or "well-ordered"
society.
Significantly, though, Rawls does not discuss how the principles
would influence either the internal structures and workings of the
family, or their relations with the wider society. Families are
15. Id.
16. Id. § 24, at 139.
17. Id. § 3, at 14-15; see also id. § 26, at 150-61 (presenting a fairly brief account of
how the two principles are arrived at in the original position).
18. Id. § 12, at 73.
19. Id. § 14, at 83-90.
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mentioned only twice in this middle section of the book, in connection
with the constraints they place on equality of opportunity, and in
connection with intergenerational justice, for example as institutions
that might play any role in either translating principles of justice into
practice or in obstructing such translation, or that might be structured
or organized with such roles in mind. Apart from this, they go
unmentioned.
Subsequently, in Part III, Rawls gives a fairly detailed account of
moral development. For he thinks that a just society, such as he
argues for, is not easy either to achieve or to maintain. He warns that
it will be difficult for people who, once the veil of ignorance is lifted,
realize that they could benefit from a less egalitarian social
distribution to sustain their commitment to the principles of justice
they have chosen in the original position, when their impartiality was
assured. Therefore, in order to try to increase the stability of the just
society, he devotes considerable attention to the development of a
sense of justice in the society's citizens. The family, otherwise largely
unmentioned, features prominently as a participant in this process.
But rather than discussing its suitability as a nurturing ground for
justice, considering how justice might apply to the family, or exploring
alternative forms of family, Rawls simply says of it: "given that family
institutions are just."2  As we shall see, even those feminists who
value major aspects of the theory have serious problems with its lack
of explicit discussion of the family and its facile assumption that
families are just. But before I discuss their critiques, I wish first to
look briefly at the ideas of feminist critics who find Rawls's whole
liberal enterprise alien to what they regard as good feminist ways of
thinking.
II. FEMINISM AND LIBERALISM: FRIENDS OR FOES?
Much feminist political theory has been critical of liberal political
theory in general and of Rawls's theory in its entirety. Linda McClain
and Martha Nussbaum have addressed such critiques in quite
comprehensive and very illuminating papers.21 It is important, as we
discuss these critiques of liberalism and responses to them, to
distinguish between feminist critiques of liberal theories-including
Rawls's theory-in their entirety, and feminist critiques of specific,
20. Id. § 75, at 490 (emphasis added).
21. Martha C. Nussbaum, Sex & Social Justice 55-80 (1999); Linda C. McClain,
"Atomistic Man" Revisited: Liberalism, Connection, and Feminist Jurisprudence, 65 S.
Cal. L. Rev. 1171 (1992). For an account and criticism of Iris Marion Young's and
Seyla Benhabib's critiques of liberalism, from which I draw in what follows, see Susan
Moller Okin, Reason and Feeling in Thinking About Justice, 99 Ethics 229 (1989).
Neither McClain, Nussbaum, nor I address Bonnie Honig's postmodernist feminist
critique of A Theory of Justice in Political Theory and the Displacement of Politics
(1993), which focuses on a couple of pages of Rawls's 600-page book.
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though sometimes very important, aspects of liberal theories, such as
the public/private dichotomy and the (explicit or implicit) assumption
that the subjects of liberalism are the male heads of households. The
latter critiques, I contend, can be addressed without abandoning the
central tenets of liberalism and liberal theory; the former, which I
shall discuss first, cannot.
Liberal political theory, as well as liberal jurisprudence, has been
found by many feminist theorists to be "male" or "masculine." As
Linda McClain writes, responding to such critiques, but first
summarizing their essence:
A central theme of the critique has been that the law embodies a
masculine perspective in emphasizing autonomy and the individual
over interdependency and the community. Liberalism has been
viewed as inextricably masculine in its model of separate, atomistic,
competing individuals establishing a legal system to pursue their
own interests and to protect them from others' interference with
their rights to do so. Hence, it is said that liberal, masculine
jurisprudence has exalted rights over responsibilities, separateness
over connection, and the individual over the community.22
Many of these charges have been specifically aimed at Rawls's A
Theory of Justice. Related criticisms often brought against liberal
theories, again including Rawls's, are that they abstract overly from
actual human beings and thus obscure, or render irrelevant,
differences among them, and that they stress the importance of
rationality, undermining the importance of the emotions both as
definitive of human nature and as crucial for moral theorizing.23
Those who characterize liberalism in these various ways are often
termed "relational feminists" or "cultural feminists." They often
advocate alternative conceptions of the person and of social relations,
more in line with those found in communitarian theories. When
women's experience of the world is taken into account, they argue,
connection, responsibility, community, caring and attention to
differences-neglected or deprecated in liberalism-will take their
proper place in moral and political theorizing.
Relational feminism has its early roots in two influential theories of
the early 1980s: Carol Gilligan's famed theory about women's
"different voice," and communitarianism, especially that of Michael
Sandel. Gilligan's feminist theory of moral development began as a
critique of that of the Kohlberg school, which owes much to Rawls's
work and prioritizes justice, rights, and principles. Gilligan, pointing
out that Kohlberg's empirical work had dealt exclusively with male
22. McClain, supra note 21, at 1173-74 (citations omitted).
23. Examples of the former type of critique are Seyla Benhabib, The Generalized
and the Concrete Other and Iris Marion Young, Impartiality and the Civic Public, both
in Feminism as Critique (Seyla Benhabib & Drucilla Cornell eds., 1987). Examples of
the latter are found in Jaggar, supra note 8, passim.
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subjects, contrasts with it a morality built on care, contextuality, and
concern for others, which she finds more characteristic of the female
subjects she studies.24 Sandel's critique of Rawls depends in part on
an idealization of the traditional family-an institution Sandel claims
is beyond the need for justice; but it is also based on a critique of the
Rawlsian "self," which Sandel interprets as disembodied and
unembedded in any social or cultural reality.25
Two prominent feminist political philosophers, Iris Marion Young
and Seyla Benhabib, developed critiques of Rawls's liberal theory of
justice that resonate with themes central to Gilligan's and Sandel's
work. Young argues against the ideals of impartiality and universality
in moral reasoning, claiming that they attempt to eliminate difference
and "otherness," and create a false dichotomy between reason and
feeling-overvaluing the former and denigrating or devaluing the
latter. She thus considers Rawls's theory to be as rationalist,
monological, and abstracted from particularity as Kant's. 26 Benhabib
argues, similarly, that in universalistic moral theories such as Rawls's
and Kohlberg's, "ignoring the standpoint of the concrete other leads
to epistemic incoherence. "27 In Rawls's original position, she claims,
"the other, as different from the self, disappears.... Differences are
not denied: they become irrelevant., 28  With only a "generalized
other," Benhabib concludes, "what we are left with is an empty mask
that is everyone and no one. 29
Such relational feminist critiques, however, often caricature or
misunderstand liberal thought (as does much of the communitarian
critique). They take as representative of liberalism ideas that do play
some part in the liberal tradition; but they tend to misinterpret these
ideas or their roles in the theories. For example, they treat the
characteristics of parties in the original position as if the original
position were less a heuristic device than a theory of the self or of
human nature. They interpret "autonomy," a concept central to most
liberal theory, as if it meant atomism rather than self-determination.
And they tend to draw a sharp distinction between an "ethic of
justice" and an "ethic of care," finding the latter absent from liberal
thought.30
I have argued that Rawls's liberal theory of justice can plausibly be
24. Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice (1982). On Gilligan's theory, see Susan
Moller Okin, Thinking Like a Woman, in Theoretical Perspectives on Sexual
Difference 145-59 (Deborah Rhode ed., 1990).
25. Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice (1982).
26. Iris Marion Young, Toward a Critical Theory of Justice, 7 Soc. Theory & Prac.
279 (1981); Young, supra note 23.
27. Benhabib, supra note 23, at 89.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. McClain, supra note 21, at 1174-75, 1203 & n.157. Again, the terms are
Gilligan's.
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read as combining both of these approaches. Thus read, it should
confound such critics.3" The actors (or actor) at the crux of the
theory-the parties in the "original position" who arrive at the
principles of justice-are indeed said by Rawls to be "rational" and
"mutually disinterested." Thus they appear, superficially, to fit the
relational feminist version of atomistic "liberal man." The charge that
difference and otherness are absent appears initially to be borne out
by Rawls's suggestion that those in the original position are identical.3 2
However, those who stress only the characteristics of rationality,
mutual disinterest and sameness fail to note that the actors Rawls so
describes have another, crucially important, characteristic, which gives
his "veil of ignorance" its name. They do not know any of their
personal attributes or attitudes, or the social position they will find
themselves in, in the society whose principles of justice they are
choosing.
Indeed, Rawls foresaw misperceptions of his theory that focus on
the Rawlsian "self" as rational and disinterested, and warned that the
theory is likely to be regarded as based on egoism if the mutual
disinterest assumption about those in the original position is
highlighted in isolation from the other specifications. Seen instead in
their totality, he says, the combination of qualities ascribed to them
"forces each person in the original position to take the good of others
into account."33 As I have argued, those behind the Rawlsian veil of
ignorance
can be perceived as thinking only for themselves, only because they
do not know which self they will turn out to be and, therefore, must
consider the interests of all possible selves equally.... In the
absence of knowledge about their own particular characteristics ...
they must think from the position of everybody, in the sense of each
in turn.3
4
For actual persons (rather than participants in a heuristic device),
who of course know who they are, to do this requires not rational
egoism but, rather, strong empathy and a readiness to listen to the
very different points of view of others. Rather than exemplifying an
overly abstracted and rationalistic "ethic of justice," Rawls's liberal
theory of justice is built to a large extent on an ethic of care; it is at
least as concerned with certain important emotions as with rationality,
and with human differences as with similarities. As McClain
31. See Okin, supra note 21.
32. See Rawls, A Theory of Justice, supra note 6, § 24, at 139 ("[Slince the
differences among the parties are unknown to them, and everyone is equally rational
and similarly situated, each is convinced by the same arguments. Therefore, we can
view the choice in the original position from the standpoint of one person selected at
random.").
33. Id. § 25, at 148.
34. Okin, supra note 21, at 244.
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concludes, referring to Rawls's explicit rejection of indifference as a
value for the just society, "Rawls's theory envisions not a disembodied
individual, but a society where recognition of interdependency leads
to mutual respect-and where mutual respect entails not the right to
be let alone but an almost tender-hearted solicitude for one
another."35 For real persons to have the strong sense of justice Rawls
expects of the citizens in his well-ordered society requires that those
citizens have well-developed capacities for empathy, care, and
concern for others-certainly not the self-interest and instrumental
rationality that are but a part of his prescription for the party or
parties in the original position.36 However, the achievement of such
qualities places a special burden on families, which Rawls's theory
requires to be sources from which moral development originates.
And, paradoxically, the families envisioned in both A Theory of
Justice and Political Liberalism seem incapable of meeting this
challenge.
McClain, Martha Nussbaum, I and others who have defended
Rawls's version of liberalism against anti-liberal feminist critiques
have done so in part because we think that liberalism properly
understood, with its radical refusal to accept hierarchy and its focus on
the freedom and equality of individuals, is crucial to feminism. While
we agree that many liberal theorists, past and present, have failed to
fulfill their commitment to the individual, in part by relegating women
to "natural" subordination within families, in part by simply
assuming-but then paying no attention to-all the work women do
to produce and reproduce the supposedly "independent" male self, we
argue that consistent and fully developed liberalism, quite radically
revised so as to include women, has great potential for feminism.
Indeed, as Nussbaum deftly puts it, most of liberalism's failing is not
that it is too individualist, but that, in its views of the family it is not
individualist enough.37 Whatever the faults of past liberals, surely no
contemporary liberal theory should be able to get away with ignoring
more than half of human adults. Nussbaum relates how women in
various parts of the world, where liberalism does not in general
prevail, are appealing to liberal concepts such as autonomy, rights,
and self-respect to make their case for women's equality, freedom,
and even bodily integrity.38 And McClain points out that, even in
cases in which the ethic of care might be expected to yield better
35. McClain, supra note 21, at 1209.
36. To be sure, Rawls's construction of the original position is designed so as to
eliminate from the formulation of the principles of justice biases that might result
from particular attachments to others, as well as from particular facts about the self.
But surely impartiality of this kind is a reasonable requirement of any theory of
justice.
37. Nussbaum, supra note 21, at 65.
38. Id. at 55-56.
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arguments for feminist-friendly positions, liberalism can both be more
persuasive and yield better results.39
Many feminists, as early as the seventeenth century, have appealed
to the arguments of liberal or egalitarian theorists who themselves
ignored or excluded women in order to make claims on behalf of
women. 40  Similarly, in the late twentieth century, some feminist
theorists have built feminist arguments on prominent liberal theories,
once the latter have been subjected to the types of revision
necessitated by feminist critique. This is especially true of Rawls's A
Theory of Justice.
III. CONSTRUCTIVE FEMINIST CRITIQUES OF RAWLS'S A THEORY OF
JUSTICE
In 1974, very soon after A Theory of Justice was published,
philosopher Jane English pointed out an aspect of its theory-building
unquestioned by other early commentators-the passing assumption
that those in the original position are "heads of families" rather than
all persons, or all adults. In a paper mainly concerned with the issue
of justice between generations, she argued that "[b]y making the
parties in the original position heads of families rather than
individuals, Rawls makes the family opaque to claims of justice. 41
English noted briefly that, with respect to some issues, such as the
division of labor between the sexes, this could well be a problem:
"For example, suppose that, due to efficiency, all families gain
significantly if the natural childbearers are universally appointed as
child rearers. '' 42 Such a policy would be good from the point of view
of Rawls's "heads of families," because it is good for families
considered as single entities. However, it may be far from just or fair
from the point of view of some individuals within those families,
particularly if caring for children negatively affected their other
personal, economic or political opportunities. For one thing, it would
clearly violate Rawls's fairly demanding standard of fair equality of
opportunity. Surprisingly, however, given that the traditional division
of labor was one of the main issues being raised and challenged by the
burgeoning feminist movement at the time, English's important
critical insight about Rawls's instantly famous theory lay fallow for
39. McClain shows that liberal arguments are stronger than relational feminist or
ethic of care arguments in the case of the duty to rescue a stranger, while the
application of arguments grounded in the ethic of care to such issues as abortion are
fraught with problems. See McClain, supra note 21, at 1228-62.
40. For example, Mary Astell built on Locke's liberalism, Mary Wollstonecraft
built in part on inconsistencies in Rousseau's egalitarianism, and John Stuart Mill, in
The Subjection of Women (1869), extended some liberal and egalitarian utilitarian
arguments to women.
41. Jane English, Justice Between Generations, 31 Phil. Stud. 91, 95 (1977).
42. Id.
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nearly a decade, and a more developed feminist critique of Rawls was
slower to emerge.43
In 1983, however, Australian political theorist Deborah Kearns
zeroed in on one of the problems-one that has preoccupied feminist
scholars of Rawls since. The theory, despite its initial inclusion of the
family as part of the basic structure of society to which the principles
of justice were to apply, went on to treat women, the family, and love
as outside of the realm of justice. But this very exclusion, in its failure
to remark upon a gendered division of labor in the family that
involved injustice, threatened to undermine the development of a
sense of justice in the children who were to be the just society's future
citizens. Kearns concluded that it was because Rawls recognized that
"the family is not necessarily a just institution [that] ... he effectively
removes [it] from the scope of the principles of justice."'
In 1987, focusing largely on Rawls's A Theory of Justice, I took up
the argument that, although the social institution of gender seemed
ripe for analysis in contemporary theories of justice, it was
unaccountably absent from them. When raised, moreover, it caused
significant problems.45 While the relation between the other initial or
acquired characteristics of persons and how they fared in social
distributions was at the core of theories of justice, somehow discussion
of the social differentiation between the sexes and the allocation of
burdens and benefits along the lines of gender was missing. Most
significantly, as Kearns pointed out, the sexual division of labor in the
household, which was taken for granted by most families and affects
every other aspect of our lives, was scarcely touched upon in any of
the leading contemporary theories of justice.
I have argued that, in A Theory of Justice, Rawls not only almost
completely ignores gender, but he almost completely ignores women.
He omits sex from the list of personal characteristics that are veiled
from those in the original position and, as English pointed out,
(ominously) specifies that those who reason in the original position
are the "heads of families."46 Though he indicated several years later
that sex was to be regarded as such a contingent characteristic, he
gave no indication of recognizing that this required substantial
revision of major aspects of his theory.47 However, with this change,
43. Jane English herself died in a tragic accident within several years.
44. Deborah Kearns, A Theory of Justice-and Love; Rawls on the Family, 18 Pol:
Australasian Pol. Stud. Ass'n J. 36 (1983).
45. See Susan Moller Okin, Justice and Gender, 16 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 42 (1987). 1
argue that Walzer's Spheres of Justice (1974) pays more attention to the division of
labor than does Rawls's A Theory of Justice, but that the feminist aspects of Walzer's
argument, taken seriously, undermine his book's defense of cultural relativism.
46. See, e.g., Rawls, A Theory of Justice, supra note 6, § 22, at 128.
47. In Fairness to Goodness, 84 Phil. Rev. 537 (1975), he writes: "That we have
one conception of the good rather than another is not relevant from a moral
standpoint. In acquiring it we are influenced by the same sort of contingencies that
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considerable revision of the theory seemed called for. First, the
"heads of families" assumption would have to be retracted or, at least,
explained and justified. Second, if those in the original position, and
in the two subsequent stages of Rawls's four-stage "unveiling"-the
constitutional convention and the legislative process-were not to
know (among all the specifics about themselves) what sex they would
be once the veil was completely raised, they would surely be deeply
concerned about many aspects of social gendering and sex
discrimination as well as matters affected by biological sex
differences.48 Third, families would certainly have to be taken
seriously as part of the basic structure of society.
In A Theory of Justice, Rawls's arguments alternate references to
"men" and "his" with more neutral references to "persons" and
"parties." He shows no sign of recognition either that this
terminology is problematic or that to assume that the individuals who
reason about justice are the heads of families takes issues of justice
within families right off the agenda. At the time he was writing, this
kind of omission was only just beginning to be noticed in various
academic disciplines. In the early 1970s, philosophers and political
theorists still routinely used male pronouns and referred to people as
"men." Economists assumed-as Rawls appeared to-that the family
could be treated as if it were a single individual, and as if only one of
its members (its male head) counted as "a rational economic actor;"
and sociologists cleaved to the structural functionalist view that rigid
sex roles were necessitated by efficiency in the fulfillment of the
essential functions that the family performs for society.49 Even in this
intellectual climate, however, especially given that Rawls himself
listed the family as one of the basic social institutions to which the
theory of justice was to apply, the "heads of families" assumption
sounded immediate warning bells for any feminist reader. But when
Rawls relates, in Part II of A Theory of Justice, how the two principles
of justice are applied to the basic institutions of society, as I said
lead us to rule out a knowledge of our sex and class." Id.
48. As for the fourth stage of the sequence, Rawls thought that, even ideally,
judges and administrators applying the laws could know all the facts about themselves
without prejudice to justice. Strongly doubting this, in Justice, Gender, and the
Family, I evoked a cartoon in which three robed, male justices look down at their very
pregnant bellies, as one says: "Perhaps we'd better re-consider that decision." Susan
Moller Okin, Justice, Gender, and the Family 102 (1989). Recent work by Nancy
Crowe bears out my and the cartoonist's concern. Crowe shows, for example, in work
based on twenty years of evidence, that the probability that a Republican male judge
on a three-judge federal court panel will vote in favor of a female plaintiff in a sex
discrimination case is 28%, whereas the probability a Republican female will vote this
way is 53%. Nancy Crowe, Women in Black: The Effect of Judges' Sex on Legal
Decisions (Oct. 20, 2003) (paper given at the Radcliffe Institute for Advanced Study).
49. See any philosophical journal of the late sixties, for this usage. The prevailing
assumption in economics was argued in detail by Gary S. Becker, A Treatise on the
Family (1981). Talcott Parsons & Robert F. Bales's Family, Socialization and
Interaction Process (1955) exemplifies the prevailing view in sociology.
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earlier, he discusses at length their application to all of the previously
named institutions of the basic structure-except the family. The
questions of whether and how the family, in its traditional or any
other form, is a just social institution and how or whether it translates
the principles of justice into social practice are never raised.
In one significant passage, Rawls does address the issue of formal,
legal sex discrimination. He states that inequalities in basic rights that
are based on "fixed natural characteristics," such as "[d]istinctions
based on sex.., race and culture" are acceptable only if "justified by
the difference principle," and that such "inequalities are seldom, if
ever, to the advantage of the less favored."50 However, this reasoning
is applied only to basic rights, such as freedom of speech, religion, and
suffrage. In addition, it does not address the very real problem that
formal equality between members of different races or sexes often
bears little relation to actual equality. In the case of sex equality, this
especially is so in the context of a long history of oppression and
exclusion of women-a history in which all major social institutions
have been constructed on the assumption that someone other than
their participants is taking care of the young, the old, the sick, and
even the participants' own daily needs.5
The only place where A Theory of Justice says much about the
family is in the section about moral development. Here, as I
mentioned earlier, while acknowledging the significance of families
for moral development, Rawls simply assumes that they are just.
Given their prominent role in his theory of moral development, it is
particularly striking that he would simply assume the justice of
families, a presumption he affords no other part of the basic structure.
Moreover, he writes very much as though he is thinking in terms of
traditional, gendered family structure and roles.52 Thus I surmised,
departing from Kearns's interpretation, that Rawls omitted discussion
of what justice would require in families not because he recognized
that families were not just, but rather because he perceived no
injustice in traditional, gendered family arrangements. I agreed,
however, with Kearns's conclusion that Rawls's theory of justice
50. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, supra note 6, § 16, at 99. It is interesting that the
difference principle is introduced here in qualifying a basic right, whereas in general
the equality of basic rights takes precedence over the difference principle. It is also
interesting that, in effect, Rawls's suggestion is in line with the legislation that
Congress felt obliged to pass when a federal appeals court bizarrely interpreted the
Pregnancy Discrimination Act as meaning that no state legislation could favor
pregnancy, by giving pregnant women any entitlements not shared by everyone.
51. One of the best explanations of this point is made by Catharine MacKinnon,
Difference and Dominance, in Feminism Unmodified (1987).
52. See Rawls, A Theory of Justice, supra note 6, § 71, at 467-68. He says, for
example, that the content of the ideals that one learns first within the family "is given
by the various conceptions of a good wife and husband, a good friend and citizen, and
so on." Id. at 468; see also Okin, supra note 48, at 96 (providing a greater elaboration
of this point).
1550 [Vol. 72
JUSTICE & GENDER
contains serious problems, not only for any reader who was concerned
with justice for women, but also for the coherence of his arguments
about moral development. 3  Families are obviously, as Rawls
recognized at the beginning of the book, an important part of the
basic structure of society, strongly influencing the life chances of their
members-especially women, when the families are gender-
structured. And though Rawls relied heavily, in his account of the
development of a sense of justice that he considered essential to the
stability of a just society, on families that he assumed were just, he
provided no reasons at all for this assumption, nor any discussion of
changes in social structures or policies that might better justify it.
These problems with Rawls's theory of justice seemed in part due to
the weight of the Western tradition of political thought, in which
questions having to do with women and the division of labor between
the sexes are so often ignored or, at best, attributed to "nature."54
Even when issues of sex and gender preoccupied the great
philosophers, as they did Rousseau, they tended until the 1970s to be
virtually ignored by subsequent interpreters and teachers of the
tradition." Within the tradition (if that word is interpreted liberally),
while rare feminists such as Mary Astell, Olympe de Gouges, Mary
Wollstonecraft, John Stuart Mill, and George Bernard Shaw had
challenged it, the norm was to assume, or to argue, that the division of
labor between the sexes and the sexual hierarchy it was presumed to
justify were natural, not political. 6 Thus, only men belonged in the
realm of culture and political life, where they-unburdened by day-to-
day preoccupations and freed from the partial, emotional ties
associated with intimacy-could debate serious concerns such as
justice amongst themselves, capable due to their superior rationality
of following just principles. As Carole Pateman and Fran Olsen both
brilliantly pointed out, the dichotomy between the "public" and the
53. One of the oddest rejections I ever received from a journal was in response to
my submission of Justice and Gender to Ethics, in 1986. The rejection letter was
accompanied by several readers' reports, the essence of one of which was that,
although the paper succeeded in showing that Rawls's theory of justice excluded
women from its subject-matter, the author had failed to say anything significant about
"the theory itself." I wondered if this reason for rejection would have been given in
response to a critique of a theory of social justice for not including men.
54. Two of the clearest examples of such thinking are in Book I of Aristotle's
Politics and Book V of Rousseau's Emile.
55. The works mentioned in notes 1-6 supra had challenged this, but too recently
to have had much effect on political theorists writing in the 1970s. The main
exceptions to this interpretation of the canon were a few Straussians who, on the one
hand, seized upon the arguments defending the subordination of women and, on the
other, contended that those philosophers who argued for the equality of the sexes
either did not mean what they wrote (for example Plato), or were not "great" (for
example John Stuart Mill). Among the first general contemporary political theories
to reflect on and critique aspects of gender were Michael Walzer's Spheres of Justice
(1983) and Philip Green's Retrieving Democracy: In Search of Civic Equality (1985).
56. See also Okin, supra note 48, at 25-40.
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"private" spheres of life had long served to separate out and to shape
the sphere in which men, perceived as autonomous, independent, and
often self-interested individuals, had rights and made contracts, from
the sphere in which women took care of the daily needs of the
supposedly autonomous men and of children-the sphere in which
bonds were assumed to be naturally hierarchical and motivations
altruistic. Olsen's most brilliant point is that "[b]ecause the state is
deeply implicated in the formation and functioning of families," the
notion that it can choose whether to intervene in the formation and
functioning of families is nonsense; the only real question is how it
intervenes." Thus contemporary feminists were arguing powerfully,
in the footsteps of predecessors such as Wollstonecraft and John
Stuart Mill, that neither families nor the divisions of labor within them
can be conceived of as natural, in the sense of unaffected by coercive
laws.58
While Rawls did not expressly spell out the public/private
distinction in A Theory of Justice, his assumption that the parties who
developed the principles of justice were "heads of households" relied
heavily on it, as did his stated reason for the assumption-that heads
of families, even if otherwise assumed to be motivated by rational self-
interest, could be expected, altruistically, to take into account the
interests of other members of their own families. Moreover, since
Rawls's just society requires its actual members (as opposed to the
artificial construct that was the party in the original position) to be
57. Frances E. Olsen, The Myth of State Intervention in the Family, 18 U. Mich. J.
L. Reform 835, 837 (1985).
58. Carole Pateman, Feminist Critiques of the PublicdPrivate Distinction, in The
Disorder of Women (1987); Olsen, supra note 57. Reading both these articles, but
especially Olsen's, was for me a "scales falling from my eyes" experience. See Okin,
supra note 48, at ch. 6. Regardless of such work, Gerald Cohen, at the very moment
of acknowledging the influence of feminist theory, falls prey to the notion that
families are free from legal coercion. In Where the Action Is: The Site of Distributive
Justice, he considers the idea that Rawls's basic structure might consist only of the
major social institutions that are "coercive (in the legal sense)." G.A. Cohen, Where
the Action Is: The Site of Distributive Justice, 26 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 3, 18-20 (1997). His
"signal example" of a major institution that "can depend far less on law than on
convention, usage, and expectation" is the family. Id. But of course the law frequently
extends its coercive arm to enforce familial responsibilities, and the threat that it may
do so influences a great deal of apparently "uncoerced" family behavior. Millions of
non-custodial parents are required by law to pay child support, have their wages
garnished, and are sometimes imprisoned for failure to pay; millions of married and
(especially) divorced individuals are required by law to support each other financially
in various ways; at least hundreds of thousands of parents are charged with child
abuse or with child neglect. In October 2003, a single mother in Connecticut, who
was employed 60 hours a week, was convicted of felonious neglect of her home and
family after her 12-year old son-bullied mercilessly at school-killed himself. Marc
Santora, After Son's Suicide, Mother Is Convicted of Unsafe Home, N.Y. Times, Oct.
7, 2003, at B1. Cohen's apparent unawareness of the extent of use of coercive laws
that lurk behind the "usages and expectations" of families is an astonishing example
of both the power and the longevity of the notion that families are havens of privacy
and voluntary action.
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neither self-interested nor wholly altruistic, but instead to have well
developed "senses of justice," this reliance on the public/private
dichotomy was a significant problem. It seemed to undermine rather
drastically his theory of moral development, and therefore to reveal a
rather serious internal problem for the theory. Whereas Kearns had
asked: "[H]ow can a sense of justice develop in an unjust
institution?"59 I questioned strongly whether Rawls's bald, unargued
statement that the family was a just institution sufficed as a basis for
his reliance on families at the heart of his theory of moral
development.'
In Justice and Gender and Justice, Gender, and the Family, I
attempted to extend the argument beyond critique towards
developing a feminist reading of Rawls's theory of justice. I argue
that, in spite of the problems noted, the feminist potential of Rawls's
method of thinking about justice and his conclusions is considerable.
Once the veil of ignorance is understood as hiding from its
participants their sex as well as their other particular characteristics
and circumstances and the unjustified "heads of households"
assumption is relinquished, the original position is a powerful concept
for challenging the gender structure. Once we dispense with the
traditional liberal assumptions about public versus private, political
versus non-political spheres of life, we can use Rawls's theory as a tool
for feminist criticism with which to think about how to achieve justice
between the sexes, both within the family and in society at large. As a
result, the theory of justice would be improved. It would reflect the
presence of women's, as well as men's, points of view in the original
position. And it would no longer be weakened by its reliance, for the
first stages of moral development, on a basic social institution that was
either naively assumed to be just or to which the principles of justice
were not considered to be applicable.
In Justice, Gender, and the Family, I venture to spell out some of the
arguments that might be made, and the conclusions that might follow,
from using this revised version of Rawls's theory. I ask how a theory
of justice that applied Rawls's two principles to families as well as to
the other institutions of the basic structure of society would change
gendered assumptions and practices. In particular, how might
representatives who did not know whether they were to be men or
women in the society they were planning or legislating for employ law,
education and other public policy to change the division of labor in
families so as to promote equality of fair opportunity and the equal
worth of political liberty for women? How might laws and other
policy instruments apply to gender relations in families and
workplaces, especially, the requirement that permissible inequalities
59. Kearns, supra note 44, at 41.
60. Okin, supra note 48, at 97 & n.28.
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benefit the least advantaged? In the late-twentieth century era of
significant transition in and disagreement about relations between the
sexes, it seemed to me that two types of public policies, resulting
mostly from application of the principle of equality of fair opportunity
and the difference principle, could alleviate the injustices of gender.
The first would encourage men and women to share the public and
the domestic, the paid and the unpaid roles and responsibilities of
family life, equally, so that both might participate on an equal footing
in their various roles-at work, in civil society, and in politics-in the
non-domestic spheres of life. Such policies, I argued, would need to
include subsidized early child care and after-school care for children,
flexible working hours for parents and other caregivers, gender-
neutral parental and other family-related leave, and firmly enforced
anti-discrimination law in all necessary areas. The second type of
policies would protect those (perhaps mostly, but not exclusively,
women) who choose to undertake the bulk of unpaid family work,
from the vulnerabilities they now incur. Such policies would include
equal division of the earner's paycheck between the earning and the
non-earning spouse, and family law ensuring that, in the event of
divorce, both post-divorce households would have the same standard
of living.61
In his recently published response to feminist critics, Rawls agreed
with most, if not all, of these specific suggestions. I will merely
introduce this recently published response now, and summarize and
discuss it in the last two sections of the paper. Meanwhile, I will turn
to his previously published but post-A Theory of Justice work,
especially Political Liberalism, in which Rawls's response to feminist
criticism of A Theory of Justice was mostly not to respond. Moreover,
his responses to other critics as well as certain other changes he made
in his theory made his problems with feminism worse. To these I shall
now turn.
IV. How POLITICAL LIBERALISM COMPOUNDED RAWLS'S
PROBLEMS WITH FEMINISM
For some years before Rawls's Political Liberalism was published in
1993, elaborating further his theory of justice and responding to many
of its critics, a manuscript authored by him entitled Women and the
Family had been in circulation among his students and their students.
In it, Rawls took up some of the feminist critique discussed above.
However, to the surprise of some readers, this response was not
included in the new book, though revised versions of parts of it have
recently appeared in print, included in The Idea of Public Reason
61. For a fuller account of my argument, see id. at 170-86.
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Revisited 2 and in Justice as Fairness: A Restatement.63  Thus, in
Political Liberalism, Rawls addresses feminist critics only very briefly
and obliquely, in his Introduction. He mentions that a number of
"major matters" had been omitted from A Theory of Justice, including
"the justice of and in the family"-though he reminds us that he did
"assume that in some form the family is just."' 4 He remarks that
since, in contemporary society, "among our most basic problems are
those of race, ethnicity, and gender," his chosen focus on toleration, in
the new book, might seem dated.65 Then, noting that A Theory of
Justice had been criticized for not dealing with problems of gender
and the family, he briefly notes that he thinks his conceptions and
principles can be addressed to them. He does not attempt to do so,
though, beyond stating tellingly that, "the equality of the Declaration
of Independence which Lincoln invoked to condemn slavery can be
invoked to condemn the inequality and oppression of women. '"66
Not only did Political Liberalism not respond, beyond this
intriguing and elusive passage, to feminist critics. Certain aspects of
the newly elaborated theory-notably Rawls's determination to
differentiate his political theory of justice from a more comprehensive
theory-made his problems with feminism worse, despite the
promising suggestion made at its outset. Not surprisingly, Political
Liberalism was very soon critiqued by feminist theorists. The new
framing of the theory, as a discussion about how a just society of
citizens with diverse conceptions of the good can be stable over time,
we argued, revealed even more clearly the internal problems caused
for the theory by Rawls's neglect of justice within families. Central
aspects of the revised theory rendered even more problematic than
before Rawls's passing assumption that families are just institutions.
For he now made it abundantly clear that in his just, pluralist society,
"reasonable" conceptions of the good included religions that both
preached and practiced highly sexist modes of life. "[E]xcept for
certain kinds of fundamentalism," he supposes, "all the main historical
religions... may be seen as reasonable comprehensive doctrines."67
62. John Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited (1997), reprinted in Collected
Papers 573, 595 (Samuel Freeman ed., 1999).
63. John Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement 162-68 (Erin Kelly ed., 2001).
64. John Rawls, Political Liberalism xxxi (1993).
65. Id. at xxx.
66. Id. at xxxi. See my two alternative interpretations of this passage in Susan
Moller Okin, Political Liberalism, Justice, and Gender, 105 Ethics 23, 39-43 (1994).
67. Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 64, at 170. The reason he specifies for
this is that these religions admit of "an account of free faith." Id. But it is quite
unclear what this has to do with these religions being "reasonable" by Rawls's own
explanation of the term. See id. at 48-54. Here, "reasonable persons ... desire for its
own sake a social world in which they, as free and equal, can cooperate with others on
terms all can accept" and "insist that reciprocity should hold within that world." Id. at
50. One might think that "reasonable religions" should be held to the same standard,
and also that "reasonable persons," not knowing their own sex behind the full or the
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Yet the basic texts of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam are rife with
sexism: the Torah/Bible reverses the reality of reproduction so that
the first woman is made from a man, tells a history of the Jews from
which women are virtually absent, and advises wives to obey their
husbands. The Qur'an explicitly advocates beating women "from
whom you fear disobedience," and suggests that some barrier be
placed between the sexes, which has been interpreted in a myriad of
ways, including heavy compulsory veiling and the "seclusion," or
socially enforced imprisonment, of women in their homes, in much of
the history of Muslim peoples.68 Reformed versions of all three
dominant Western religions have, of course, acknowledged the
equality of the sexes in numerous ways, including admitting women to
their various ministries. However, the more orthodox (but by no
means necessarily fundamentalist) versions of all three-including
Orthodox Judaism, Catholicism and some Orthodox and Protestant
branches of Christianity, and many variants of Islam-still
discriminate against women and reinforce their subordination within
religious practices, and within and outside the family, in numerous
significant ways.69
In addition to indicating Rawls's acceptance of such beliefs and
associated practices as "reasonable" comprehensive conceptions of
the good, acceptable even in the just, well-ordered society of ideal
theory, Political Liberalism exacerbated the problem feminists had
pointed out regarding whether or not the family is part of the basic
structure of society. While Rawls more or less reiterates the position
taken in A Theory of Justice, stating that "the nature of the family"
belongs to the basic structure, he also, seemingly paradoxically, states
that the political is "distinct from ... the personal and the familial,
which are affectional ... in ways the political is not."7 Philosopher
John Exdell and I argued (in papers published at about the same
time) that these aspects of Political Liberalism were not simply
weaknesses and inconsistencies in its argument. They also
endangered the very stability of the just society that the book aimed
to ensure.71
It is clear that the even greater distinction between the political and
the non-political that Rawls develops in Political Liberalism leads to
partial veils of ignorance, might insist on this.
68. The quotation is from Surah 4:34: "[A]s for those women from whom you fear
disobedience: admonish them, put them aside in their beds, and beat them."
69. Of course, women often (and men sometimes) resist. For one very obvious
example where it seems both resist in huge numbers, witness the paucity of very large
Catholic families in the United States. The "rhythm method" of contraception is not
at all reliable, yet it is the only method of birth control that is supposedly practiced by
Catholics who take the holy sacraments.
70. Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 64, at 137.
71. John Exdell, Feminism, Fundamentalism, and Liberal Legitimacy, 24 Can. J.
Phil. 441 (1994); see also Okin, supra note 66.
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serious weaknesses or inconsistencies in the book's argument. As I
have mentioned and will discuss further below, the unresolved
problems about whether the family is part of the basic structure and
whether and how the principles of justice are to apply to it are
exacerbated. In addition, the political/non-political distinction, and
the toleration of a wide range of religious and other cultural practices
that it involves, lead Rawls to allow kinds of discrimination to be
practiced against women that he disallows, if practiced against persons
differentiated by racial or ethnic group.
Rawls states clearly in Political Liberalism that the priority of right
limits permissible comprehensive conceptions of the good and
permissible ways of life, in a just society. Moreover, he specifies how
it limits them. While "justice cannot draw the limit too narrowly," just
institutions must "permit[] but also sustain[] ways of life fully worthy
of citizens' devoted allegiance."72 Admissible ideas of the good must
"respect the limits of, and serve a role within, the political conception
of justice."73 Specifically, "conception[s] of the good requiring the
repression or degradation of certain persons on, say, racial, or
ethnic... grounds" are "in direct conflict with the principles of
justice" and hence must be "discourage[d] ... or even exclude[d]...
altogether" in the just society.74 Unfortunately, Rawls does not spell
out what it means "to exclude" or "not to permit" a conception of the
good. He suggests that the discouraging of discriminatory conceptions
of the good should be done "in ways consistent with liberty of
conscience and freedom of speech," but he refrains from saying
whether, or how, the exclusion of any that are impermissible can be
accomplished in such a manner.75 This is somewhat puzzling. Could
Rawls mean that groups within the just society are free to advocate or
argue for racial or ethnic discrimination, though not to practice it?
Whether or not this is his intention, what about sex discrimination?
As I have mentioned, in seeming tension with the principles that
appear to underlie his anti-discrimination stance, Rawls accepts as
reasonable and therefore permissible all the main historical religions
except for certain forms of fundamentalism. But many variants of
these religions not only preach but also practice many forms of sex
discrimination. As Exdell and I both asked, why are conceptions of
the good that require the repression or degradation of women not
susceptible to the same judgment and subject to the same treatment as
those that are similarly racist or ethnically discriminatory?
There are two likely reasons for Rawls's not applying his anti-caste
principle to sex as well as to race and ethnicity.76 One is that applying
72. Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 64, at 174.
73. Id. at 176.
74. Id. at 195-96.
75. Id. at 195.
76. In a recent article, I show that several other prominent contemporary political
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it would rule out many prominent religions as beyond the pale of
reasonableness. But what kind of a reason is that? Why not instead
argue that unless and until they reform themselves, as many variants
of religion have already done, so as to accommodate sex equality,
sexist religions too are to be discouraged or even excluded altogether
from the just society, being no less inconsistent than racist or
ethnically discriminatory ones are with the principles of justice? The
other likely reason is that, in keeping with the long line of thinking
about the public/private distinction that I briefly looked at above, he
may have thought that the "affectional" nature of family life meant
that women are less likely to be subjected to the degrees of
degradation or repression that persons experience because of their
race or ethnicity. But this way of thinking, too, has been exposed in
the last few decades as largely based on myth. When beliefs about
gender, marriage and family encourage the formation of families in
which women, especially mothers, can easily be made vulnerable,
oppressed and subordinated, many women do become vulnerable,
oppressed and subordinated.
This problem, in turn, intensifies the stability problem. How?
Surely the stability of Rawls's just society must still rely on the moral
development of its members-specifically, their development of a
sense of justice-as well as on gaining the acceptance of its adult
members? But whereas he, in Political Liberalism, seeks to render his
just society more stable because more tolerant of a diversity of values,
by reinforcing the distinction between the political and the non-
political and applying the principles of justice only to the former
sphere of life, by doing so he greatly reduces the potential for the
development of a sense of justice in families. As Exdell and I have
both argued, the reduced scope of justice specified by Rawls for the
sake of stability of the just society also decreased social stability by
tolerating-accepting as reasonable-unjust, sexist family forms for
the sake of religious pluralism. How, we asked, might children
acquire the sense of justice that was needed for the society's stability
within families that are not themselves regulated by the principles of
justice, but might well instead become places where oppression is able
to flourish.77 In the account of moral development offered in Political
Liberalism, Rawls completely omits the role of families as major
influences during early childhood. But if the omission means that
philosophers, including Joseph Raz, William Galston, and Chandran Kukathas, share
Rawls's propensity to conceive of sex-based oppression as if it differs significantly in
its seriousness from race-based oppression. See Susan Moller Okin, "Mistresses of
Their Own Destiny": Group Rights, Gender, and Realistic Rights of Exit, 112 Ethics
205 (2002). On the anti-caste principle in U.S. constitutional law and its implications
when taken seriously, see Cass Sunstein, The Partial Constitution 338-45, passim
(1993). For discussions of gender as caste that are strongly influenced by Sunstein's
ideas, see Okin, supra note 48, at 65-68, and Okin, supra note 66, at 39-43.
77. See Exdell, supra note 71; see also Okin, supra note 66.
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these passages of A Theory of Justice are meant to stand unchanged,
then they are rendered even more problematic by the problems that I
have outlined here.78
In a recent essay entitled Rawls and Feminism, in The Cambridge
Companion to Rawls, Martha Nussbaum takes up such feminist
criticisms of Political Liberalism, agreeing with some of them but
taking issue with my claim that Rawls is inconsistent in restricting,
discouraging, or even excluding comprehensive conceptions of the
good that repress or degrade persons on ethnic or racist grounds, but
at the same time allowing as acceptable and reasonable all of the
major, frequently sexist, religions, excepting certain forms of
fundamentalism. She claims that I am wrong about the fate of
unreasonable comprehensive doctrines in a society based on Rawls's
political liberalism. For Rawls, she claims, free speech protects the
reasonable and the unreasonable alike, since "no political, religious,
or philosophical speech can be censored, in Rawls's view, absent the
existence of a grave constitutional crisis" in which free political
institutions may be failing to preserve themselves. She also takes
issue with my failure to "distinguish between doctrines holding that
women should have unequal rights of citizenship and doctrines
holding that they are metaphysically unequal or dissimilar in some
other respect."79 Thus, she defends Rawls's distinction between the
political and the non-political, interpreting it to mean, in this context,
that as long as women's equal political rights are not questioned,
women's equality in other respects is fair game for question or attack
since comprehensive doctrines that subordinate women must be
tolerated.
It is unclear whence Nussbaum derives the extent and quasi-
absolute status of freedom of speech she attributes to Rawls. As
evidence for her statement about Rawls disallowing censorship of
speech, she cites "p.343, etc." of Political Liberalism. The only
passage on page 343 that seems pertinent is Rawls's statement that
"[w]ithin our tradition there has been a consensus that the discussion
of general political, religious, and philosophical doctrines can never be
censored."80 On the following page, too, he mentions the "agreement
that all general discussion of doctrine .. . is fully protected."'" These
statements, however, are statements about our political tradition,
rather than direct statements by Rawls about his own beliefs. More
importantly, they need to be understood in context; they are part of a
78. Rawls indicated to me in a conversation at Stanford in May 1993, that he
intended his theory of early moral development in Part III of A Theory of Justice to
be read as unchanged by the arguments of Political Liberalism.
79. Martha C. Nussbaum, Rawls and Feminism, in The Cambridge Companion to
Rawls 488, 509 (Samuel Freeman ed., 2003).
80. Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 64, at 343.
81. Id. at 344.
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lengthy section in which Rawls argues that it is inconsistent with
liberal democracy to consider as crimes such speech as "seditious
libel" or "defamation of the government," or to censor doctrines
calling for the overthrow of the government by force-except in cases
of such imminent danger to democratic political institutions as he
considers never to have existed in the United States, even during the
Civil War. Rawls does not explicitly endorse the "consensus" of "our
tradition" he reports. But even if he did, to endorse freedom of
speech for "the discussion of general political, religious, and
philosophical doctrines," in the context of arguing against the
criminalization of seditious libel against the government is hardly the
same thing as to claim that "no political, religious, or philosophical
speech can be censored," as Nussbaum reports. 2
So what did Rawls himself think about freedom of speech, beyond
ruling out the criminalization of "seditious libel" and like offenses
against governments? What did he think about freedom of speech
that defames or degrades some categories of persons, for example,
which is considerably more pertinent than the case of seditious libel to
the issue Nussbaum is discussing? Considering both A Theory of
Justice and Political Liberalism, it is very clear that Rawls considers
free speech to be one among a number of basic liberties, which, "it is
important to recognize, must be assessed as a whole, as one system."83
Taken together, they constitute "a fully adequate scheme" of
liberties.' While Rawls argues that liberty "can be limited only for
the sake of liberty itself," he also says that "[c]learly when the liberties
are left unrestricted they collide with one another."85 He states clearly
numerous times that when any of these liberties conflicts with any
other, all of them need to be considered and they need to be balanced,
limited and adjusted against one another. 6 Thus none of them has
absolute protection. In a sentence familiar to all students of Rawls's
work, he states: "Taking the two principles [of justice] together, the
basic structure is to be arranged to maximize the worth to the least
advantaged of the complete scheme of equal liberty shared by all."87
In the same section of Political Liberalism on which Nussbaum
seeks to base her near-absolutist interpretation of his views about free
speech, Rawls makes clear his own nuanced position on the subject.
He subjects to ridicule-an unusual tactic for Rawls-Justice
Holmes's case of someone's falsely shouting "Fire!" in a crowded
theater. This example is utterly "trivial," Rawls says, since it works
82. Nussbaum, supra note 79, at 509 (emphasis added).
83. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, supra note 6, § 32, at 203.
84. Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 64, at 356.
85. Id.
86. See, e.g., Rawls, A Theory of Justice, supra note 6, §§ 32, 39, at 203, 205, 244;
Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 64, at 356.
87. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, supra note 6, § 32, at 205.
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only against "the view, defended by no one, that all speech of
whatever kind is protected."8 This is very close to the "entrenched"
position Nussbaum attributes to him. She states that he would rule
proposals favoring serfdom or slavery off the political agenda in the
sense that they would not be able to be voted on, but that he takes the
position that "anyone who likes may make such proposals
unconstrained."89 But Rawls makes it fairly clear that he holds no
such view. Instead, he reminds us that the basic liberties are not
absolute. They can be restricted in their content, though "only if this
is necessary to prevent a greater and more significant loss ... to these
liberties."9  The standard to which delegates and legislators must
appeal in such cases, he argues, is "what best advances the rational
interest of the representative equal citizen in a fully adequate scheme
of basic liberties."'" He also argues in this same section that when any
of the basic liberties comes into conflict with the fair value of political
liberty, "here too the basic liberties must be considered together and
weighed up against the threat their use might pose to this liberty, such
that no one liberty can expect unconditional protection."92
This brings us to the second point Nussbaum seeks to make in
defense of Rawls: that feminists such as myself have neglected the
distinction political liberals make between challenges to women's
political equality and challenges to women's equality in other
respects-such as their metaphysical equality. The problem with this
defense is twofold. First, Rawls's own prioritization of the fair value
of political liberty along with the other basic liberties means that he
must be concerned to protect more than women's formal political
rights and legal equality. Indeed, anything, including any influential
doctrine that contributes to women being represented politically far
less than their proportion in the general population, becomes a matter
of grave concern, since it endangers the basic liberties of women.
Second, the whole point of my and Exdell's critiques of the
political/non-political distinction is that it is a false dichotomy. I
argued, along the lines of Marx in On the Jewish Question, that there
is no way of separating out and isolating women's political equality
88. Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 64, at 345.
89. Nussbaum, Rawls and Feminism, supra note 79, at 509.
90. Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 64, at 356.
91. Id.
92. Id. Rawls's main account of the fair value or equal worth of political liberty,
which runs parallel to his concept of fair equality of opportunity, is in Section 36 of A
Theory of Justice, titled "Political Justice and the Constitution." It focuses on class
inequality, but there is no reason why the standard it establishes should not apply to
political inequality along race, ethnic or gender lines. Rawls says: "[I]deally, those
similarly endowed and motivated should have roughly the same chance of attaining
positions of political authority irrespective of their economic and social class." Rawls,
A Theory of Justice, supra note 6, § 36, at 225.
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from all the other aspects in which women are unequal in a sexist
society. 93
Thus, for example, were Rawls confronted with a situation in which
a not insignificant religious group was promulgating the view that
women have the souls of pigs (the kind of "metaphysical doctrine"
about women's inequality that Nussbaum appears to want to protect,
in the interest of religious freedom, and to seek Rawls's mantle of
approval for so protecting), and in which such speech appeared to be
distinctly affecting the fair value of women's political liberty, by
preventing them from being taken seriously as political candidates, it
would seem that Rawls might well argue for the suppression of such
religious speech in favor of women's political liberty. Since he argues
that "even in a well-ordered society under favorable circumstances
liberty of thought and conscience is subject to reasonable
regulations, '" one might surmise that he would find such regulation
reasonable in the rather unfavorable circumstances spelled out in my
example. Nussbaum apparently accepts the highly dubious distinction
between the political and the non-political that so much is made of in
Political Liberalism. But of course "metaphysical" attacks on the full
humanity of women are not distinct from "political" attacks on their
equal citizenship. 95 Both Rawls and Nussbaum are deluded on this
score. But Rawls has the possible recourse of calling on his own
earlier and clearer ideas about the need to balance and limit the
various basic liberties from A Theory of Justice. Nussbaum has
jumped to the conclusion that, as long as women's formal political and
legal equality were not being directly attacked, for Rawls, freedom of
speech, thought or conscience would trump the fair value of political
liberty for women. But this seems highly dubious. The fair value of
political liberty and the priority Rawls has clearly given it seem to
restrict the permissibility of sexist comprehensive doctrines far more
than he might himself have realized. This may have far-reaching
implications for political liberalism, which cannot be pursued further
here.
93. Okin, supra note 66.
94. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, supra note 6, § 39, at 244.
95. Examples from all over the world seem to bear this out almost daily. Two
examples reported on the same day in late 2003: When E.U. President Berlusconi
jokes, at a meeting including European parliamentarians of both sexes, that since the
discussion of the matter on the agenda is not progressing, those present should
instead discuss "women and football," is the political equality of the women present
(and those they represent) preserved, or is it undermined? When male leaders in an
Afghani loya jirga tell the female members of that council that they should moderate
their demands because Islam considers a woman to be worth only half of a man, is
their political equality threatened, or not?
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V. RAWLS'S RECENTLY PUBLISHED RESPONSE TO FEMINIST
CRITIQUES
Finally in 1997, in an essay entitled The Idea of Public Reason
Revisited, Rawls first published his response to feminist critics, which
is also included in Justice as Fairness: A Restatement.96 In it, he calls it
''a misconception" to think that "the principles of justice do not apply
to the family and hence.., do not secure equal justice for women and
their children."97 He writes: "If the so-called private sphere is alleged
to be a space exempt from justice, then there is no such thing."98 He
also states plainly that "the family is part of the basic structure, since
one of its main roles is to be the basis of the orderly production and
reproduction of society and its culture from one generation to the
next" and he acknowledges (for the first time) that "reproductive
labor is socially necessary labor." 99 It seems as if Rawls was finally to
attend to the justice or injustice of the gender structure, at least within
families. But then he seems to take most of this back again. He says
that the principles of justice "are to apply directly to [the basic]
structure, but are not to apply directly to the internal life of the many
associations within it, the family among them."'10 What could this
mean? If we substitute, here (in single inverted commas), Rawls's
initial definition of the basic structure, it means that the principles of
justice "are to apply directly to 'the way in which the major social
institutions distribute fundamental rights and duties and determine
the division of advantages from social cooperation', but are not to
apply directly to the internal life of the many associations within [the
basic structure], the family amongst them."'01  This is more than a
little puzzling. It is rendered even more puzzling when taken in
conjunction with Rawls's statement that it is a misconception to think
that the principles of justice do not apply to the family. 2 First, Rawls
has never previously suggested that the principles of justice are not,
generally, to apply directly to the social institutions that make up the
basic structure of society, as well as to the ways in which they
distribute rights and duties and determine the division of advantages.
But if the principles of justice are not to apply directly to institutions
such as courts and constitutions, legislatures and laws, and even to
duly regulated markets and systems of ownership, then one might well
96. Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, supra note 62, at 595-601 ("On
the Family as Part of the Basic Structure"). A similar section is included in Rawls,
Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, supra note 63, at 162-69.
97. Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, supra note 62, at 596.
98. Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, supra note 63, at 161.
99. Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, supra note 62, at 595-96.
100. Id. at 596.
101. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, supra note 6, § 2, at 6.
102. Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, supra note 62, at 596.
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ask what is the point of having them at all? We need to proceed with
Rawls's argument, to make out what he could mean.
Next, he repeats the argument, first made in Political Liberalism,
that the family is similar in this respect to other associations such as
churches and universities, business firms or labor unions. Like them,
he says, it cannot violate the basic rights and freedoms of the equal
citizens who are its members. But, like them, he implies, it is not itself
subject to the principles of justice. Just as we do not require churches
to be democratically governed, so we should not require families to be
internally governed by the principles of justice; the family is "not
peculiar in this respect." I think there is a lot of confusion here, which
I have yet to completely sort out: Surely it is not as if families and
universities should not be internally regulated by the principles of
justice, but legislatures and courts should. Indeed it may make less
sense to have these latter institutions directly ruled by such principles
than to have families ruled by them. I can see no good reason, for
example, to apply the difference principle to the property-holdings of
the members of a legislative body. Nor, surely should the principle of
equal "political liberty" or decision-making rights apply to all
participants in a jury trial-where justice is better served if witnesses
answer questions, judges sentence, and only jurors vote. On the other
hand, neither can I see any good reason why decisions in families
should not be made equally by their members (giving the same special
treatment to children of different degrees of maturity as they are
given regarding their public voting rights), or why the difference
principle should not be applied within families. 3 Perhaps, ironically,
we may conclude that families are the quintessential place for justice,
rather than a place where it is not needed or is impossible to apply, as
has been more commonly thought. Not that families should be just
just, as I have argued in response to Sandel; rather that justice is their
primary, basic virtue, and that "nobler virtues" such as generosity and
the willingness to sacrifice one's interest for those of others are
unreliable, and even dangerous to some family members, unless built
upon it.°0
This is not the direction that Rawls takes, however. As in Political
Liberalism, so in the last published works he draws a distinction
between "the point of view of people as citizens and their point of
103. Robert Nozick cites what he regards as the inapplicability of the difference
principle even within families as a prima facie reason for its rejection as a principle for
the wider social sphere. He argues in Anarchy, State, and Utopia that it is reasonable
for parents to devote more educational resources to their most talented than to their
least talented children. Though I cannot do it here, I think justice demands the
reverse, or at least demands equal expenditures on both, except in such cases (for
example, severe deprivation or living in the context of a "winner take all"
occupational structure) in which the whole family's future survival is likely to depend
on the earnings of the most talented of its members.
104. Okin, supra note 48, at 26-28.
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view as members of families and of other associations.""1 5 He claims
that, from the latter point of view, wanting "a free and flourishing
internal life appropriate to the association in question... [w]e
wouldn't want political principles of justice-including principles of
distributive justice-to apply directly to the internal life of the
family.... Here those principles are out of place.,
116
What Rawls does insist on repeatedly, however, is that the
principles of political justice impose external restraints on families, as
on other associations. Thus, "[s]ince wives are equally citizens with
their husbands, they have all the same basic rights, liberties, and
opportunities as their husbands; and this, together with the correct
application of the other principles of justice, suffices to secure their
equality and independence.""1 7 Later, Rawls spells out further what
he refers to here as the correct application of the other principles of
justice. He says: "A long and historic injustice to women is that they
have borne, and continue to bear, an unjust share of the task of
raising, nurturing, and caring for their children,"'0 8 which can render
them particularly vulnerable in the event of divorce. He notes that, if
a basic cause of women's inequality as citizens is their greater share in
nurturing and caring for children, "steps need to be taken either to
equalize their share, or to compensate for it."'0 9 In addition, while
freedom of religion requires that "some traditional gendered division
of labor within families" be allowed, it must be "fully voluntary
and ... not result from or lead to injustice.""'  While Rawls says that
it is not for political philosophy to decide the specifics of this, he refers
with seeming approval to the split paycheck idea, and to the equal
sharing of assets in the event of divorce. He calls it "intolerably
unjust" that a husband may leave his family taking his earning power
with him. Given what Rawls had written earlier about the
appropriateness of invoking "the same equality" invoked by Lincoln
in his condemnation of slavery to the inequality and oppression of
women, I have come to think of these suggestions of his as his version
of "forty acres and a mule" for women.
VI. A BRIEF RESPONSE
It is gratifying to feminist critics of Rawls that he eventually
responded to our concerns about his theory of justice in some detail.
Moreover, in doing so, he affirmed some of the suggestions we had
come up with as to how to make families more just social institutions.
However, several aspects of his response are still either puzzling or
105. Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, supra note 62, at 597.
106. Id. at 597-98.
107. Id. at 597.
108. Id. at 598.
109. Id. at 600.
110. Id. at 599.
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unsatisfactory. First, he restates the idea that families are like other
private associations, without addressing the trenchant critiques of this
position that have been made. Families are not voluntary associations
readily entered and exited. Families of origin are not entered at all
voluntarily. And though families one forms are usually entered
voluntarily, they are by no means always exited voluntarily; moreover,
even when they are, typically such exit does not come without
considerable struggle or loss. Divorce, even under the most favorable
circumstances, could hardly be compared with graduating from
college, or choosing to teach at a different university. Moreover
families, unlike other private associations such as universities and
churches belong, for excellent reasons, among the basic social
institutions to which Rawls has said from the outset that his principles
of justice are to apply. Indeed, there is no way of reconciling Rawls's
latter-day position that families are like other, more voluntary
associations with his own definition of the basic social institutions-
those that affect their members' opportunities from birth, those that
"have deep and long-term social effects and in fundamental ways
shape citizens' character and aims, the kinds of persons they are and
aspire to be."'11 How could social institutions so defined not include
families, which would thereby be differentiated clearly from the other,
more voluntary, associations? Again, if the unknowns in the original
position include one's sex, as Rawls has indicated since 1975, how
could Rawls's "parties" not be seriously concerned with issues of
justice internal to families? Surely they would want to ensure that, in
the just society, public policy and institutions strongly fostered the
equal division of unpaid labor within the home, and that women and
men actually pursued this equal division so as not to disadvantage
women both at home and in most other spheres of life? Would one
not want to see justice within families, albeit in many respects
probably not directly legally enforced, given very high priority in the
well-ordered society?
Moreover, Rawls has not responded to the important concern that
has been raised repeatedly since Kearns's paper in 1983 about the
internal inconsistency of a theory of justice that depends heavily for
the moral development and socialization of its citizens on an
institution that is not itself internally regulated by the principles of
justice."' As I have asked frequently both here and elsewhere, how
could the social institution in which, as Rawls acknowledges, small
children's first inklings of justice emerge in the context of their love
and trust for those who care for them, forming the basis for moral
111. Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 64, at 68.
112. See the response to this concern in S.A. Lloyd, Situating a Feminist Criticism
of John Rawls's Political Liberalism, 28 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 1319 (1995). Rawls cites
this, among other feminist responses to his work, but does not indicate whether he
concurs with its argument.
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development, not itself be based on internal justice?113 While he
refers several times in "The Idea of Public Reason Revisited" to the
role of the family in nurturing and developing citizens with a sense of
justice, his notion that families are not special (or "peculiar" as he
puts it) but, rather, similar to other social associations such as
universities and trade unions seems completely to neglect the crucial
function of families in promoting a sense of justice in the young."4
Finally, a point that warrants further development than I can devote
to it here: Rawls simply states, without argument, that "[w]e wouldn't
want" families to be regulated internally by principles of distributive
justice. This view has also been voiced by some other very influential
philosophers and political theorists, including Michael Sandel and
Allan Bloom."1 But having spent much time thinking about justice
and its applicability or lack of applicability to families, some of us are
not sure that this is at all evident. We still ask: "Why not?"
113. My most sustained discussion of this is in Political Liberalism, Justice, and
Gender, supra note 67, at 32-39, where I ask how the "political virtues" Rawls argues
for in Political Liberalism can be acquired in unjust gender-structured families,
bringing in some recent findings about moral development and about actual families
of various types.
114. Gerald Cohen's Where the Action Is: The Site of Distributive Justice, supra
note 58, draws an interesting and important analogy between issues of justice within
the family and other voluntary aspects of egalitarianism in a just society, but is not
concerned with the special role of the family in moral education which, as feminists
have argued, makes its internal justice particularly compelling. See also Andrew
William's response, Incentives, Inequality, and Publicity, 27 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 225
(1998).
115. Sandel's claim that families are "better than just" is a pivotal piece of the
argument he makes against Rawls's claim that justice is the primary moral virtue,
which he presents as a case against liberal accounts of justice in general. See Sandel,
supra note 25, at 30-35. Bloom's claims that families are unjust, but naturally and
necessarily so, because of the respective "natures" of women and men (especially
men), are heavily based on Rousseau's anti-feminism, and are of considerable current
influence because of the weight of neo-conservatism within the George W. Bush
administration. See Allan Bloom, The Closing of the American Mind (1987); see also
Jean Jacques Rousseau, Introduction to Emile (Allan Bloom trans., 1979). For a
critique of both claims, see Okin, supra note 48, at ch. 2.
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